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Most approaches to innovation bear the implicit assumption that increased innovativeness leads 
to improved organizational performance. Thus more attention has been focused on 
innovativeness than on innovation performance – on novelty than on value. However recent 
empirical evidence calls into question the unqualified optimism surrounding innovation, and 
leads us to ask what we really know about when technological innovation improves performance. 
In this paper, we seek to make a contribution by presenting the results of an exhaustive review of 
the existing knowledge of the outcomes of technological innovation. Our synthesis of the 
literature allows us to relate, in one parsimonious model, the drivers and moderators of the 
antecedents, technical outcomes, and performance outcomes of technological innovation and 
technological change. We also make sense of the proliferation of terms, and consequent 
terminological ambiguity, which characterize a lot of work on technological innovation. Finally, 
in the light of the model presented and recent developments in work on firm capabilities, we 
indicate possible avenues for further development of this critical area of research 
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“‘If a man … make a better mousetrap than his neighbour, though he build his house in 
the woods, the world will make a beaten path to his door,’ claimed Emerson. Yet the 
inventors of new mousetraps, and other gadgets too, are more likely to be found at the 
bankruptcy courts than in the millionaires’ playgrounds of the Caribbean or the French 
Riviera” (Grant, 2002: 335). 
Scholars and managers have spent the last two decades studying the drivers of innovation, and 
trying to increase firm innovativeness, respectively. These endeavors have been driven by the 
implicit but generally accepted assumption that increased innovativeness leads to improved 
organizational performance. Thus more attention has been focused on innovativeness than on 
innovation performance; on novelty than on value. 
However, recent data is beginning to make some observers question the unqualified optimism 
surrounding innovation. Despite the emphasis on innovation and especially innovativeness, 
“evidence is growing that innovation processes in many industries are not yielding the benefits 
they should” (Linder, Jarvenpaa, and Davenport, 2003: 43). Although measures of 
innovativeness have increased, economic performance has not improved correspondingly 
(Kandybin and Kihn, 2004; Linder et al., 2003), and surveys repeatedly show that managers are 
unsatisfied by returns on growth in innovation (Andrew, 2005; Andrew and Sirkin, 2003). Thus 
“the unspoken truth seems to be that for a very large number of companies, innovation 
spending continues to rise, but it is generating neither enough profit nor competitive 
advantage” (Andrew, 2005: 7). 
Furthermore, the empirical relationship between innovativeness and firm performance is yet to 
be demonstrated conclusively. As a whole, studies relating innovativeness to firm performance 
have provided ambiguous evidence (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001), and mixed results are 
common (Chandler and Hanks, 1994; Haneda and Odagiri, 1998; Leiponen, 2000). A literature 
review of the area found that two-thirds of the studies showed a positive relationship between 
innovativeness and performance, but the rest found a negative relationship, or none at all 
(Capon, Farley, and Hoenig, 1990). 
____________________ 
Acknowledgments: We are grateful to Bruno Cassiman and Joaquim Vilà, as well as to Africa Ariño, Johanna Mair, Giovanni 
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Yet in retrospect these findings are logical, since individual innovations can vary widely in 
their performance outcomes. An excessive focus on innovativeness masks the innovation-level 
contingencies that determine the success or failure of individual innovations. Thus an 
important question arises, which has been insufficiently addressed in the literature: When does 
innovation improve firm performance, and (perhaps more importantly) when does it not? 
To begin to address this question, we need to redirect our attention from the predominant focus 
on the antecedents of innovation, to the firm-level outcomes of innovation. It is important to 
characterize what we currently know about the outcomes of innovation in order to delineate 
the gaps in our knowledge, as well as to identify research programs capable of filling in those 
gaps. 
In this paper, we seek to make a contribution by presenting the results of an exhaustive review 
of extant knowledge on the outcomes of technological innovation. Our synthesis of the 
literature allows us to relate, in one parsimonious model, the drivers and moderators of the 
antecedents, technical outcomes and performance outcomes of technological innovation and 
technological change (Figure 5). We also make sense of the proliferation of terms, and 
consequent terminological ambiguity, which characterizes a lot of work on technological 
innovation. 
Our review shows that we know where technological innovation comes from, as well as what 
makes some firms more innovative than others. Thus there is a very well-developed body of 
knowledge on the antecedents of technological innovation (Figure 2). 
In addition we find that we know a lot about how technological innovation leads to industry-
level technological change. As such, there is also a well-developed body of knowledge on the 
technical outcomes of technological innovation (Figure 3). 
We find that we know quite a bit about how and when industry-level technological change is 
likely to improve firm performance, and when it is likely to worsen it. Thus there is also a fairly 
well-developed body of knowledge on the performance outcomes of technological change 
(Figure 4). 
However, we find that we still know very little about when individual innovations will improve 
economic performance, and when they won’t. Thus the clarification of the determinants of the 
performance outcome of technological innovation represents the next frontier for research on 
the outcomes of innovation in general, and technological innovation in particular. 
By accumulating the aforementioned streams of research (Figures 1-4), we derive the model in 
Figure 5, which thus summarizes what we currently know about the determinants of the 
antecedents, technical outcomes, and performance outcomes of technological innovation. 
In the next section, we briefly discuss the conceptualization of technological innovation and 
our organizing framework for the literature review, as well as some descriptive statistics in the 
review. We then go on to the characterization of the existing knowledge, followed by a 
discussion of the findings and then the conclusion. 
Technological Innovation and Performance Outcomes 
Innovation is the embodiment of new approaches to doing business in products/services and/or 
their production and delivery systems (Burgelman, Maidique, and Wheelwright, 2001; Grant,  
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2002). These “new approaches” however, may have different foci. Thus an innovation’s novelty 
may arise from “new approaches” to technology, firm organization, financing, business model 
etc.; embodied in products or processes (Drucker, 1985; Grant, 2002; Hamel, 2000; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1999; Markides, 1997). As Peter Drucker puts it, “innovation goes right through all 
phases of business. It may be innovation in design, in product, in marketing techniques. It may 
be innovation in price or in service to the customer. It may be innovation in management 
organization or in management methods” (Drucker, 1954: 40). 
Technological innovation has become more important in recent times, as technical 
advancement has quickened and grown more pervasive. As a result, firms have increasingly 
sought to create enhanced value through the embodiment of technical advances or new 
technologies in products and/or their production and delivery systems. Thus technological 
innovation is not just the commercialization of new technologies, but innovation, where the 
focus of novelty is  technological. For this reason, it is not confined to “high technology” 
industries but is, in Drucker’s words, “as important to a bank, an insurance company or a retail 
store, as it is to a manufacturing or engineering business” (ibid). The end product of 
technological innovation may thus not be a technology itself, but it will embody at least some 
new technology or technical advance. 
Nevertheless, like any other innovation, one of the most important criteria for judging 
technological innovation has to be its impact on performance. The outcome of technological 
innovation is critical because an important reason why firms innovate is “to create enhanced 
value in products and services and to gain sustainable advantage in relation to rivals” 
(Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997: 274). Differences in profitability between competing firms 
are often a disequilibrium phenomenon resulting from internal or external change (Grant, 2002; 
Rumelt, 1987), where “internal change is generated by innovation” (Grant, 2002: 231). Hence 
the characterization of existing knowledge about the determinants of the outcomes of 
technological innovation is an important task. 
One Term, Several Uses 
Unfortunately, this task is complicated somewhat by the fact that scholars investigating the 
outcomes of “technological innovation” have not used the term in a univocal way.
1 Three 
distinct uses emerged from an iterative analysis of the terminology in major English-language 
journal articles and books on the subject. 
Firstly, the term “technological innovation” is sometimes used to refer to an improvement in the 
performance of a technology (or technologies) along some dimension(s) relevant to the 
technology in question; even before it is, or can be, embodied in products or processes. This 
phenomenon is primarily technical, and not necessarily commercial or strategic in nature, as 
experience shows that many technologies never become commercially viable. Henceforth 
therefore, we will refer to this phenomenon as a technical advance. 
At other times, “technological innovation” is used to refer to the substitution of the core 
technologies used to develop products that satisfy a particular need, and/or their production and 
delivery systems. According to Anderson and Tushman, “the core technology of an industry” 
                                              
1 Table 1 gives an idea of the complexity of analysis required to relate existing studies considering the outcomes of 
“technological innovation.”  
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often “evolves through long periods of incremental change punctuated by technological 
discontinuities” (1990: 606). This is an industry-level phenomenon that arises from a complex 
interaction between technical advancement, innovation, and other social, economic, and 
political processes. Henceforth therefore, we will refer to this phenomenon as technological 
change. 
Table 1 
Existing Dimensions of Some Concepts in Technological Innovation and Change 
Concept Classification  Dimension  Source 
“Technology”  Product or process  Technology application  Wide usage e.g. Butler, 
1988 
  Sustaining or disruptive 
Impact on established trajectory of 
performance improvement 
expected by customers 
Christensen and Bower, 
1996 
“Innovation”  Incremental, modular, 
architectural, or radical 
Impact on core design concepts 
embedded in components, and 
their linkage 
Henderson and Clark, 1990 
  Incremental or radical  Differential improvement of 
innovation over previous state 
Wide usage e.g. Abernathy 
and Utterback, 1978. 
  Systemic or autonomous  Extent to which value is 
independent of other innovations  Teece, 1987 
  Regular, niche-creating, 
architectural or revolutionary 
Impact on technological and 
market “transilience”  Abernathy and Clark, 1985 
“Technological 
Innovation”  Incremental or radical  Novelty for incumbents, of 
technological knowledge-base 
Wide usage e.g. Hill and 
Rothaermel, 2003 
  Incremental or drastic  Degree to which previous product 
is still a viable substitute  Arrow, 1962 
“Technological 
Change”  Incremental or radical 
Degree to which incumbent 
technological capabilities made 
obsolete 
Wide usage e.g. Afuah, 
2000 
  Incremental or generational  Degree of improvement within the 
same technological paradigm 
Lawless and Anderson, 
1996 
  Incremental, complementary, 
or encompassing 
Type of alteration made to “core” 
or “complementary” activities 





destroying discontinuity or 
incremental TC 
Degree of technical advance; 
technological paradigm of the new 
technology; and impact on 
incumbent capabilities 




Finally, as mentioned earlier, “technological innovation” may refer to the embodiment of 
technical advances or new technologies in products/services and/or their production and 
delivery systems. This usage refers to a firm-level phenomenon with commercial or strategic 
aims, and is thus perhaps the most conceptually consistent of the three uses of the term. 
Henceforth therefore, unless used between quotation marks, the term technological innovation 
(TI) will refer to this phenomenon. 
Figure 1 gives a visual summary of the definitional associations between these three uses of the 
term “technological innovation.”  
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Antecedents and Outcomes of Technological Innovation 
Our distinction between three uses of the term “technological innovation” allows us to show 
that the various “performance” outcomes in the literature can actually be grouped into two 
types of outcomes: technical outcomes, and firm performance outcomes properly speaking. 
Firstly, one possible outcome of TI is technical in nature. The technology underlying a TI can be 
so superior to existing alternatives that it triggers a substitution of the core technologies used 
to satisfy a focal need (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Suarez and 
Utterback, 1995). This technological change resulting from successful TI is thus a technical 
outcome. 
Secondly however, TI also has direct and indirect firm performance outcomes. On the one hand, 
the greater or lesser success of TI has a direct effect on firm performance (Banbury and 
Mitchell, 1995; Christensen, Suarez, and Utterback, 1998; Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, and 
Anderson, 2002). On the other hand, technological change arising from TI has important effects 
on firm fortunes (Christensen and Bower, 1996; Henderson, 1993; Henderson and Clark, 1990; 
Tripsas, 1997), which we can thus consider an indirect performance outcome of TI. 
In conjunction with the antecedents of innovation, we use these two types of outcomes to 
organize the studies in this review, arriving at the four groups of studies outlined in the next 
section.  
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Literature on the Outcomes of Technological Innovation 
The literature on innovation is massive. It remains vast even when narrowed to that portion 
focusing on the outcomes of technological innovation. This literature shows a remarkable 
breadth in terms of methodology, empirical settings, theoretical foundations, the variables 
measured, and the dimensions of technological innovation considered. Thus the choice of a 
template for organizing this subset of the literature cutting across the categorizations was 
challenging. 
Our review of empirical and theoretical literature on the outcomes of technological innovation 
used three main sources: articles published in major English-language organizations- and 
economics-oriented North American and European journals; scholarly volumes edited by the 
most influential authors in the field of technological innovation and change; and the seminal 
books or manuscripts which have most influenced thinking on the outcomes of technological 
innovation. Some descriptive statistics of the sources reviewed are shown in Table 2. 
As it was impossible to cover all relevant studies in one review article, we selected studies 
based on the rigor of their empirical and/or theoretical development; their importance in 
starting off important lines of thought or investigation; and the degree to which they were cited 
by others (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). We allowed the network of studies to grow forward 
and backward in time with no constraints (ibid.), and thus arrived at the present review 
encompassing 31 journals, 16 edited scholarly volumes, and over 30 books; with the temporal 
boundaries being 1934 to the present. 
We used the emergent distinction between three uses of the term “technological innovation” to 
organize the literature into four groups, roughly corresponding to the numbered arrows in 
Figure 1. Thus we divided the voluminous literature into studies of: innovation antecedents 
(arrow I); technical outcomes (arrow II); performance outcomes of technological change (arrow 
III); and performance outcomes of technological innovation (arrow IV). 
Although other classifications of the innovation literature have been used in the past, our focus 
on firm-level outcomes invariably cut across or over-extended otherwise useful categorizations. 
For example, one common distinction is that between literature on innovation development and 
literature on innovation adoption (Rogers, 2003). However, performance outcomes are most 
pertinent to a subset of the adoption literature which looks at the effects of innovation 
adoption. Some of the other subsets of this literature stream come with the implicit assumption 










IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 7 
Table 2 
Some Descriptive Statistics of the Literature Review 
Source Summary  Statistic  Value 
Journals  Number of journals 
covered by review 
31 
  Maximum number of 
articles from one journal 
47 (Strategic Management Journal) 
  Journals with eight or more 
articles (in order of number 
of articles) 
Strategic Management Journal, American 
Economic Review, Management Science, 
Journal of Product Innovation Management, 
Rand Journal of Economics, Economics of 
Innovation and New Technology, MIT Sloan 
Management Review, Research Policy, 
Academy of Management Journal, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Academy 
of Management Review, Harvard Business 
Review, and Organization Science 
Books  Number of edited scholarly 
books 
16 
  Temporal boundaries of 
edited books 
1962-2005 
  Number of other major and 
seminal books 
32 
  Temporal boundaries of 
major and seminal books 
1934-2003 
All publications  Earliest publication  1934 
  Most recent publication  2006 









Another common distinction going back at least as far as Schumpeter (1942) is that between 
invention and innovation, where the latter is seen as the commercialization of the former. 
Although the literature on invention commercialization is pertinent to our focus on outcomes, 
it usually overlooks the possibility of non-technology firms incorporating technical advances in 
their products/services (an issue covered in some of the adoption literature). In addition, the  
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inventions in question are often considered inherently valuable, while for our purposes the 
performance effect is indeterminate ex ante. 
Our organizing scheme is thus theoretically motivated, based on our interest in outcomes. The 
advantage of such a theoretically inspired organizing framework is that it allows indiscriminate 
attention to be paid to studies examining common issues from diverse perspectives. One 
disadvantage, however, is the corresponding difficulty in synthesizing findings across different 
theoretical backgrounds. Nevertheless this difficulty is not insurmountable, but is unavoidable, 
given this paper’s underlying concern with a specific theoretical issue: the determinants of the 
performance outcome of technological innovation. 
In the rest of the paper we review the existing knowledge of the determinants of the outcomes 
of TI. In doing so, we characterize and present the major findings of the literature on innovation 
antecedents (i.e. innovation itself as an outcome); technical outcomes; and performance 
outcomes of technological change and technological innovation. 
While studies of innovation antecedents have sought the determinants of the amount of 
innovation observed and why some innovators are more innovative than others, studies of 
technical outcomes have investigated the dynamics of technological change arising from TI. 
Studies of the performance outcomes of technological change have focused on the determinants 
of the effect of technological change on incumbents and new entrants, in addition to the 
impact of differential firm strategies for reacting to technological change. Finally, the relatively 
fewer studies of the performance outcomes of TI, have sought to highlight the determinants of 
the direct impact of TI on firm performance. 
As we will soon see, this last field of study is the least developed of the four, providing, at best, 
tenuous support for the “pervasive positive bias” (McGrath, Ming-Hone, Venkataraman, and 
MacMillan, 1996: 392) with respect to the performance impact of TI. 
Antecedents of Technological Innovation: Drivers of Innovation and 
Innovativeness 
Studies of innovation antecedents form the largest subset of work with implications for the 
outcomes of TI. These studies have focused on the determinants of the amount of innovation 
observed and on why some innovators are more innovative than others. Thus this field can be 
further split into two streams: studies of the drivers of innovation and studies of the drivers of 
innovativeness respectively. 
The first (and older) of the two streams grew out of economists’ concern with social welfare. At 
least since Schumpeter (1934) identified innovation as the motor of economic development, 
economists interested in the socially optimal level and diffusion of innovation, have closely 
examined the drivers of the amount of innovation observed. Early work looked at the impact of 
market power and concentration on innovation, but later work has considered a variety of 
variables as affecting underlying opportunity and appropriability conditions, and hence the 
amount of innovation observed. Most of the empirical work in this stream utilizes econometric 
methodology, and has an implicit assumption that innovation is inherently valuable. 
The second stream of work on the drivers of innovativeness is more recent, and grew out of a 
conviction in both managerial and academic circles that innovation was the key to firm 
success. Thus it has focused on explaining differing levels of innovativeness across firms in  
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Drivers of Innovation 
Drivers of Innovativeness 
similar situations. One branch of this stream has sought to explain differential levels of 
innovativeness in terms of differing firm capabilities in incorporating external knowledge. A 
second branch has focused on organizational variables such as creativity and the management 
of the innovation process. The studies in both branches encompass a wide variety of 
methodological approaches, reflecting the theoretical eclecticism typical of the field of strategic 
management from which many of them are drawn. 
Figure 2 summarizes the major drivers of innovation and innovativeness from both streams, 
while selected studies are summarized in Table 3. 
Figure 2 















Drivers of Innovation 
“One of the largest bodies of literature in the field of industrial organization is devoted to the 
interpretation and testing of several hypotheses advanced by Joseph Schumpeter (1942)” (Levin, 
Cohen, and Mowery, 1985: 20) concerning the determinants of innovative output. According to 
Schumpeter (1942), large established firms possessing some degree of monopoly power were 
likely to be the driving force behind technical progress. He suggested that their superior access 
to capital and skilled labor, in combination with their ability to effectively appropriate 
innovation, gave them considerable advantages over small firms and new entrants (Henderson, 
1993). Additionally, he emphasized that concentration reduced market uncertainty and 
provided the cash flow required to engage in costly and risky R&D on an efficient scale (Levin 
et al., 1985).  
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In contrast to Schumpeter, other authors argued theoretically that insulation from competitive 
pressures breeds bureaucratic inertia and discourages innovation (Levin et al., 1985). A seminal 
article by Arrow (1962) suggested that firms in competitive markets have significantly greater 
incentives to invest in innovation than do firms in markets characterized by a significant 
degree of monopoly power. This result, however, was contested by Gilbert and Newberry (1982) 
who suggested that Arrow’s results held only if entry was blockaded. In line with Schumpeter’s 
arguments, they showed that if there was free entry to the industry, incumbent firms with 
monopoly power would rationally pre-empt potential entrant investment in innovation in order 
to continue to profit from the extension of existing market power to a new generation of 
technology (Henderson, 1993). 
A subsequent theoretical debate over the issue (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982, 1984a, b; 
Reinganum, 1983, 1984; Salant, 1984) led to the consensus that whether incumbent 
monopolists or entrants have greater incentives to invest in innovation is a function of the 
degree to which innovation destroys existing market power, and of the uncertainty surrounding 
the innovative process (Henderson, 1993; Lerner, 1997). If the older technology remains viable 
and the new technology’s introduction is not contingent on any single firm’s investment, then 
incumbents have a greater incentive to invest in innovation. On the other hand if the new 
technology renders the old one obsolete, and its introduction is a function of investments made 
by each firm, then incumbents with market power will have less incentive to invest in 
innovation than new entrants (ibid.). 
On the empirical front, 40 years of research uncovered no systematic relationship between 
market power and innovative activity (Cohen and Levin, 1989). Many studies, however, found 
an “inverted-U” relationship, whereby innovative effort or innovative output first increased 
with concentration, and then decreased (Levin et al., 1985). Levin, Cohen, and Mowery argued 
that the ambiguous results were due to the fact that concentration did not have a direct effect 
on innovation (Levin et al., 1985). They cited studies (Scherer, 1967; Scott, 1984) in which the 
explanatory power of concentration diminished considerably on controlling for more 
fundamental technological and institutional conditions, and then went on to replicate the same 
effect in their paper (ibid). 
The emphasis on the importance of underlying technological and institutional conditions was 
also supported by Winter (1984), who suggested that small- and large-firm innovation 
responded to distinct technological and economic regimes. He hypothesized that the ability of a 
firm to innovate was influenced by what he and Richard Nelson (1974; 1982) called the 
underlying “technological regime.” Suggesting two types of technological regimes, he posited 
that “an entrepreneurial regime is one that is favorable to innovative entry and unfavorable to 
innovative activity by established firms; a routinized regime is one in which the conditions are 
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In their 1987 paper, Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter also argued that inter-industry 
variations in innovative effort were best explained not by concentration, but by the underlying 
differences in technological opportunity and appropriability conditions (Levin et al., 1985; 
Levin, Klevorick, Nelson, and Winter, 1987). Thus variables such as concentration, regulation, 
intellectual property protection, size and growth, have an indirect effect on the amount of 
innovation observed, through their impact on technological opportunity and appropriability 
conditions. 
Drivers of Innovativeness: Learning and External Knowledge 
Early work examining the impact of external knowledge on differential firm innovativeness had 
sought to explain the “stylized fact … that the number of innovations per dollar of R&D 
decreases with firm size” (Knott, 2003: 697). Indeed the finding that R&D productivity 
decreased with firm size was a common one (Cohen and Klepper, 1992; Cohen and Levin, 
1989). However, in highlighting the different technological regimes facing large and small firms 
(Acs and Audretsch, 1988; Audretsch, 1991; Winter, 1984), these studies set the stage for a 
focus on the impact of the incorporation of external knowledge on firm innovation. 
In an early study, Gort and Klepper (1982) posited, and found evidence that relative innovative 
advantage depended on the source of information leading to innovative activity. When 
information based on non-transferable experience in the market was an important input in 
generating innovative activity, then older firms would tend to have the advantage over new 
firms. However, when information outside the industry was a relatively important input in 
generating innovative activity, then new entrants would tend to have the innovative advantage 
over the incumbent firms. 
Similarly, Knott (2003) highlighted the importance of asymmetric spillovers. She pointed out 
that if large or leading firms had superior knowledge, then spillovers from other firms would 
not be helpful to them. Consequently, their innovation would stem exclusively from their own 
efforts. In contrast, small or follower firms could gain knowledge both from their own 
investments as well as from spillovers from leading firms. As a result, their apparent innovation 
per R&D dollar would be higher than that for large or leading firms. This conclusion is 
consistent with several authors who have suggested that small- and large-firm innovation are 
not independent. For instance, small firms may owe their innovative activity to former 
employees of large firms (Anton and Yao, 1995; Cassiman and Ueda, 2002; Klepper and 
Sleeper, 2002). 
Cohen and Levinthal’s seminal papers (1989; 1990) introduced the concept of absorptive 
capacity, defined as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, 
assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (1990: 128). They argued that absorptive 
capacity was largely a function of prior related knowledge (1989) and that it was critical to 
firms’ innovative capabilities. Absorptive capacity is cumulative, domain-specific, and path-
dependent (Cohen and Levinthal, 1994). Thus firms with greater absorptive capability in a given 
domain would be more innovative than others in that domain (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). 
More recently, Zahra and George (2002) extended the concept of absorptive capacity, 
reconceptualizing it as a dynamic capability with both a potential and a realized component. 
Internal knowledge is also an important input to the innovation process, and its integration 
with external knowledge is thus a critical determinant of innovativeness. Zahra and Nielsen 
(2002) found that innovative output developed with internal and external capabilities was  
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affected by the effectiveness of the firm’s mechanisms for integrating these knowledge sources. 
Similarly, Arora and Gambardella (1994) found support for the complementarity of internal and 
external know-how sourcing, while Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) found support for 
complementarity between the various innovation activities involved in these sourcing 
strategies. Thus firms combining different activities in their innovation strategy are expected to 
attain a higher degree of innovativeness than firms that focus on only one knowledge source. 
In addition to this, recent studies suggest that different knowledge sources might be related to 
different types of innovative output. For example, Nicholls-Nixon and Woo (2003) find from 
their sample that while internal R&D was positively associated with patent output, acquisition 
activity was positively related to the number of products based on new technologies, and the 
use of R&D contracts and licenses was positively related to a reputation for technological 
expertise. 
As a whole, this branch of work on the drivers of innovativeness has gathered momentum in 
recent times, and a number of insightful studies have shown how innovativeness also depends 
on variables such as network position (e.g. Ahuja, 2000), technological and market relatedness 
of merging firms (e.g. Ahuja and Katila, 2001; Cassiman, Colombo, Garrone, and Veugelers, 
2003), alignment between governance decisions and the degree of contractual hazards (Leiblein, 
Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002), and the impact of process management on various types of 
innovative output (Benner and Tushman, 2002, 2003). A major contribution of this young 
stream of literature is that it highlights the fact that innovativeness is dependent on a firm’s 
ability to leverage external knowledge, integrating it with its internal knowledge sources. 
Drivers of Innovativeness: Organizational Factors 
The second branch of innovativeness studies has identified three organizational variables that 
drive differential firm innovativeness, namely: the creativity of organizational members, the 
management of the innovation process, and the presence of organizational slack. Individual 
creativity introduces greater variation into the organization, increasing its innovative output, 
while competent management of the innovation process removes obstacles that might slow 
down the flow of innovations, efficiently integrating the innovative efforts of organizational 
members. Finally, it is has been suggested that spare organizational resources allow 
experimentation and less strict performance monitoring, leading to increased innovation. 
Many authors have considered the improvement of an organization’s innovativeness as a 
question of how to “unlock the ideas and creativity of its employees” (Kim and Mauborgne, 
1999: 51). Amabile (1997) for example, stresses that in addition to expertise and creative 
thinking, employee creativity is also a function of task motivation, and thus motivation is an 
important driver of organizational innovativeness. Among other things, such motivation 
requires a concise and compelling articulation of the value of innovation, an orientation away 
from the status quo, and the activation of an offensive leadership strategy aimed at the future, 
rather than simply trying to protect an organization’s past (Amabile, 1988). 
Employee creativity is also related to task organization, management style, and organizational 
culture. One typical finding in this line is that creativity is fostered by the use of small 
autonomous units or teams focusing on a common business or product goal (Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1999). In addition, teams with members with diverse skills, backgrounds, and 
perspectives are more conducive to higher levels of creativity (Amabile, 1997; Kanter, 1996; 
Kim and Mauborgne, 1999). Finally, creativity has been found to thrive in the presence of a  
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corporate culture conducive to willing collaboration where managers go beyond a focus on fair 
outcomes to a focus on fair process (Kim and Mauborgne, 1999). 
A second organizational factor driving innovativeness is the competent management of the 
innovation process. As Christiansen (2000) emphasizes, management structures, systems and 
practices can cause delays in the innovation process, creating roadblocks for the flow of 
innovations. Senior managers can improve innovativeness by enhancing systems, structures 
and practices at three levels, namely: the individual innovation project, the project management 
system, and business-level strategy (Christiansen, 2000; Duelli and Hültenschmidt, 2002; 
Kandybin and Kihn, 2004). At the project level, efficiency depends on project setup, 
supervision, participation, mentoring/consulting, and operational control. At the level of the 
project management system, attention to idea generation, laboratory management, funding 
systems, project structure, and project management methods affect innovative output. Finally, 
the way business systems are managed in terms of strategy, structure, and people has a decisive 
impact on the level of organizational innovativeness (ibid.). 
A third theme in organizational innovativeness is related to the role played by organizational 
slack. Cyert and March (1963) proposed that organizational slack, rather than “necessity” bred 
innovation. According to them, “the difference between the payments required to maintain the 
organization and the resources obtained from the environment by the coalition … provides a 
source of funds for innovations that would not be approved in the face of scarcity” (Cyert and 
March, 1963: 278-279). Organizations with spare time and spare resources have greater 
opportunities for experimentation and less strict performance monitoring and so should have 
the resources and managerial patience needed to innovate. 
In one of the few empirical tests of this hypothesis, Greve (2003) distinguishes between 
absorbed slack, unabsorbed slack, and potential slack. He finds that while absorbed slack is 
related to increased innovativeness, his sample shows no effect for the other two types of slack. 
Similarly, O’Brien (2003) argues that financial slack is necessary for innovativeness for three 
primary reasons. Firstly, cash flow volatility can jeopardize continuous investments in R&D. 
Secondly, financial slack can help ensure that the firm has the financial resources required to 
launch new products as soon as they are ready; and finally, sufficient financial slack can assist 
firms in making the acquisitions they deem necessary to source knowledge for increased 
innovativeness (ibid: 419-420). Operationalizing financial slack as a low leverage ratio, he finds 
support for the position that higher innovativeness (intense investment in R&D) is related to 
higher financial slack. 
Innovation Outcomes vs. Performance Outcomes 
In summary, we find that the literature provides a relatively clear theoretical account of the 
antecedents of TI. The amount of innovation observed among a focal group of firms is 
dependent on underlying technological opportunity and appropriability conditions. These latter 
in turn depend on factors such as industry concentration, growth, R&D expenditure, firm size, 
intellectual property protection, regulation, and the current technological and economical 
regime. At the same time however, innovativeness differs across individual firms facing similar 
opportunity and appropriability conditions. Such differences are explained by knowledge 
characteristics like absorptive capacity, technology sourcing strategies, integration capabilities, 
and network position; as well as by organizational factors such as member creativity, process 
management, and the presence of organizational slack. As mentioned earlier, these relationships 
are summarized in Figure 2.  
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Nevertheless, much of this literature exhibits an underlying assumption that individual 
innovations are inherently valuable. Theoretically however, individual innovations can be more 
or less successful, and empirically only a small proportion of innovations are profitable 
(Andrew and Sirkin, 2003; Rothaermel, 2001). Thus firms following prescriptions for increasing 
their innovativeness could conceivably find themselves generating a stream of worthless 
innovations. Therefore, this literature on innovation outcomes does not seem to provide a basis 
for an a priori optimistic view of the impact of TI on performance; nor does it provide much 
insight into the contingencies that could determine the performance of individual innovations. 
Nonetheless, the findings on drivers of innovation form a basis for prescriptions regarding 
policies to foster industrial innovation and competitiveness. Similarly, the findings on drivers 
of innovativeness identify levers managers could act on to increase innovative output. 
However, on the basis of these studies alone, such prescriptions would have to be made with 
the assumption that the value of a greater number of profitable innovations outweighs the costs 
of a greater number of failed innovations. 
Determinants of Technical Outcomes: Dynamics of Technological 
Change 
Studies relating to the technical outcomes of TI have highlighted determinants of the complex 
process by which TI leads to technological change. Technical advances on their own do not 
directly cause technological change; rather, new technologies enter the industry at some time or 
the other via the TI of one or more firms. If a TI is sufficiently superior to products embodying 
previous technology, (in the absence of restraining political or social forces) it can trigger a 
substitution of the core technologies used by industry participants to satisfy customer needs 
(Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986). This consequent technological change can be 
considered a technical outcome of TI. 
Two broad streams of work have isolated the determinants of the technical outcomes of TI. The 
first has focused on the drivers of the process by which TI leads to technological change. 
Studies in this stream have looked at the interaction and impact of market opportunities and 
technological effort on the process of technological change. They have also highlighted how 
design decisions and customer choices determine the technical outcomes of TI. 
A second stream of studies has investigated the patterns of technological change. This work 
suggests that technological change exhibits a cyclical pattern which is repeated over time. As 
firms introduce technological innovations over time, the consequent technological substitutions 
display long periods of incremental improvement punctuated by sharp improvements in the 
industry’s price/performance frontier. These latter are then followed by periods of technological 
ferment which end with the appearance of a “dominant design.” 
The seminal studies in both streams are based on longitudinal multi-industry data on the 
dynamics of technological change, although some other influential studies derive their 
frameworks from an inductive analysis of in-depth case studies. Figure 3 summarizes the 
findings of both streams on the drivers and patterns of technological change, while selected 
studies are summarized in Table 4.  
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Drivers of Technological Change 
Early answers to the question of the drivers of technological change (TC) revolved around two 
basic poles: the so-called “demand-pull” theories on the one hand, and the so-called 
“technology-push” theories on the other hand. Demand-pull theories pointed to market 
opportunities as the main determinants of the process through which TI led to TC. In this view, 
the causal prime mover of TC is the recognition of needs by productive units in the market, 
followed by attempts to fulfill those needs through technological innovation (Mowery and 
Rosenberg, 1979). Therefore, market signals direct innovative activity and TC. Proponents of the 
technology-push theories argued, on the other hand, that TC was autonomous or quasi-
autonomous with respect to short-run changes in the economic environment (Pavitt and Soete, 
1980). Underlining supply-side factors in TC, they pointed to the increasing role of scientific 
inputs in the innovative process, the increased complexity of R&D (making it unlikely that it 
could be a prompt innovative answer to market signals), a significant correlation between R&D 
and innovative output, and the intrinsically uncertain nature of the innovative process (ibid.). 
Figure 3 
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Dosi (1982) was one of the first to point out the flaws inherent in both extremes. He pointed out 
that on the one hand “demand-pull” theories see TC as a passive, “mechanical” reaction to 
market conditions. They are incapable of “defining the why and when of certain technological 
developments instead of others and of a certain timing instead of others” (ibid: 150), and they 
neglect changes over time in inventive capability that do not bear any direct relationship to 
changing market conditions. On the other hand, “technology-push” theories are flawed as well 
because they present technical progress as “given by God, scientists, and engineers” (ibid: 151); 
ignoring the obvious impact of economic factors in shaping the direction of the innovative 
process. 
Dosi sought to harmonize the two extremes by introducing the concepts of “technological 
paradigms” and “technological trajectories.” Technological paradigms are “an ‘outlook’, a set of 
procedures, a definition of the ‘relevant’ problems and of the specific knowledge related to their 
solution” (ibid: 148). Technological paradigms in technology are analogical to research 
programs in science, and determine the technological problems to be solved, the scientific 
principles to be applied, and the material technologies to be used (Dosi, 1984). At the same time 
though, these paradigms also define technological trajectories, which are “the direction of 
advance within a technological paradigm” (Dosi, 1982: 148). In other words, the technological 
trajectory is the pattern of problem-solving within the established technological paradigm, 
similar to Nelson and Winter’s (1982) “natural trajectories” of technological progress. 
Hence both technological and market factors drive the process of TC. Although the established 
paradigm is most influential on TC in the short run, in the long run new technological 
paradigms can arise from the interplay between scientific advances, economic factors, customer 
requirements, institutional variables, and unsolved difficulties in established technological 
paths (Dosi, 1982). Consequently, while the current technological paradigm greatly influences 
the technological trajectory, a more complex set of interactions determines the appearance of a 
new technological paradigm. 
In a similar vein, Sahal’s (1981; 1985) explanation focuses on “technological guideposts” and 
“innovation avenues.” In this system, similar to Dosi’s, a technological guidepost is a “pattern 
of design” that charts the course of innovative activity (Sahal, 1985: 71), while TC occurs along 
innovation avenues “that designate various distinct pathways of evolution” (ibid.). 
Clark (1985) deepened the analysis of the interaction between technological design decisions 
and customer choices in the process through which TI leads to TC. As an industry’s technology 
evolves, “the pattern of innovation, the kinds of design changes introduced and their timing 
and sequence, not only depend on the technical alternatives but on the interaction between the 
internal logic of the product and the evolution of customer requirements” (Clark, 1985: 236). In 
other words, on the one hand, observed patterns of TC depend on a sequence of design 
decisions related to the technical agenda, problems to be solved, cumulative experience, 
exploration of alternative technical options, and a continual refinement of current designs 
(McEvily and Chakravarthy, 2002). However, on the other hand these design decisions are also 
related to “the formation of concepts that underlie customer choice” (Clark, 1985: 241). 
Experience with new technological products, problem solving at the customer end, new uses 
customers discover for products, and emerging customer needs not only affect technical 
development (as in market-pull theories), but are also influenced by design choices. For 
example, early customer automobile purchase decisions were framed in terms of a choice 
between a “horseless carriage” and a “carriage with a horse.” However, experience with the new  
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product, as well as continued evolution of the initial product design led to the evolution of the 
concept from “horseless carriage” to “automobile,” described by a “new” set of attributes such 
as speed, mobility, endurance, payload, etc., and a “new” set of variants like “roadster,” 
“touring car,” and “coupe” (ibid: 245). 
Patterns of Technological Change 
The work of Abernathy and Utterback (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Suarez and Utterback, 
1995), along with that of Tushman and Anderson (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and 
Anderson, 1986, 1997) has greatly influenced research on the patterns of technological change. 
Extending studies on drivers of TC (David, 1985; Dosi, 1984; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Sahal, 
1985; Utterback and Abernathy, 1975), Anderson and Tushman held that technological change 
in many industries is a cyclical evolutionary process in which “the core technology of an 
industry evolves through long periods of incremental change punctuated by technological 
discontinuities” and the “emergence of a dominant design” (1990: 606). Thus each cycle is 
composed of two “eras” and two “punctuation points,” as described below. 
In the first stage, “technological change is a bit-by-bit, cumulative process until it is punctuated 
by a major advance” (Tushman and Anderson, 1986: 441). In this “era of incremental change” 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990: 606) there are continual improvements to technology within the 
same technological paradigm, “through the interaction of many organizations stimulated by the 
prospect of economic returns” (ibid.). Variation in this era is driven by elaboration of the 
established “dominant design” and the competitive focus shifts from higher performance to 
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Nevertheless, this era is characterized by “advances in the technology frontier that advance the 
state of the art … sometimes considerably”
2 (Anderson and Tushman, 1990: 609) within the 
same technological paradigm. As such, in Anderson and Tushman’s scheme, the “era of 
incremental change” can refer to either “incremental” or “considerable” improvements. Lawless 
and Anderson (1996) rectify this ambiguity by proposing the concept of “generational” TC, 
which is “a major advance within a technological regime” (ibid: 1185). Thus the major 
characteristic of this era of evolutionary
3 change is the cumulative enhancement of the current 
dominant design (sometimes incremental and sometimes generational) within the same 
technological paradigm. 
The era of evolutionary change is ended by the appearance of a “technological discontinuity”: a 
sharp improvement in the industry’s price performance frontier associated with the emergence 
of a new technological paradigm (Anderson and Tushman, 1990; Tushman and Anderson, 
1986), which introduces an era of intense technological variation. “A revolutionary innovation 
is crude and experimental when introduced, but it ushers in an era of experimentation as 
organizations struggle to absorb (or destroy) the innovative technology” (Anderson and 
Tushman, 1990: 610-611). This “era of ferment” (ibid.) is characterized by competition between 
alternative technologies within the new paradigm, as well as by competition with old 
technologies, which typically experience significant improvement, in reaction to the new 
technological threat (Cooper and Schendel, 1976). 
Competition between rival technologies in the era of ferment is a highly complex process whose 
result cannot be predicted ahead of time (Tegarden, Hatfield, and Echols, 1999). The technical 
outcome is a function of several factors, such as user preferences and producer market power 
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990), complementary assets controlled by competitors, industry 
regulation or government intervention (Suarez and Utterback, 1995), and the presence of 
“increased returns to adoption” (Arthur, 2001) among the competing technologies (Katz and 
Shapiro, 1985, 1986; Schilling, 2002). 
The case of competition among technologies exhibiting increasing returns on adoption has 
been especially studied in the strategic management and economic literature. Increasing returns 
on adoption could come from many sources, such as learning by using, network externalities, 
scale economies in production (positive feedback), informational increasing returns, and 
technological interrelatedness (Arthur, 2001; Katz and Shapiro, 1985, 1986). The selection 
process in this case is potentially “inefficient” in an economic sense because the “winning” 
technology might not be the socially optimal one (Arthur, 2001). Although it is difficult to say 
which technology will win ex ante, it is not impossible to predict which technologies will end 
up losing or being “locked out” (Schilling, 2002). Factors that might lead to “lockout” are a 
relatively small installed base, relatively poor availability of complementary goods, a failure to 
invest in learning, and poor entry timing (ibid.). 
Finally, in mass markets with relatively homogenous customer tastes, or where industry output 
is a high volume assembled or manufactured product, the era of ferment may end with 
convergence on a “dominant design” (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975), which is “a specific path 
along a design hierarchy, which establishes primacy among competing design paths” (Utterback 
                                              
2 Emphasis added. 
3 We introduce this term to stress the fact that technological change in this era can be incremental or generational, as 
long as it remains within the same technological paradigm.  
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and Suarez, 1993: 47).
4 However, in technology markets characterized by increasing returns on 
adoption, the outcome might be the adoption of one or more of the competing technologies, 
depending on a host of factors such as whether or not technologies are “sponsored” (backed by 
strategic investment), their future cost advantage (Katz and Shapiro, 1986), the availability of 
complementary products, installed base, entry timing (Schilling, 2002), learning effects, 
production scale effects, and lock-in (Arthur, 2001). With convergence on a dominant design(s), 
the industry returns to an era of evolutionary progress once again (Christensen et al., 1998; 
Suarez and Utterback, 1995; Utterback and Suarez, 1993), closing the cycle of TC. 
Technical Outcomes vs. Performance Outcomes 
In summary then, we can identify a relatively mature and well-developed literature on the 
technical outcomes of technological innovation. These analyses show the emergence of 
technological change from TI to be partially determined by the path-dependent technical 
trajectory followed in problem solving, as well as by the overall technological paradigm in 
force. Technological evolution is further co-determined by the development of customer 
understanding and choice, under the influence of social and institutional factors. The overall 
process, though, has been found to be markedly patterned across several industries, exhibiting 
eras of evolutionary progress and eras of disruptive change, punctuated by “technological 
discontinuities” and the emergence of a “dominant design” respectively. 
Nevertheless, these studies do not seem to justify an overly optimistic view of the performance 
outcome of TI. The distinction between technical and performance outcomes stressed in this 
article is important because a favorable technical outcome will not necessarily lead to improved 
firm performance. In this line, work by Tegarden et al (1999) has highlighted the importance of 
other variables, such as entry timing (Mitchell, 1989, 1991), integration (Iansiti, McFarlan, and 
Westerman, 2003), and flexibility to switch to a different technology, as being to some extent 
independent of the eventual technology outcomes. Other work (e.g. Shamsie, Phelps, and 
Kuperman, 2004) suggests late-mover advantages as a reason why a focus on the technical 
outcome alone could lead to disappointing performance outcomes. 
Nonetheless, these studies do provide insights useful for the study of performance outcomes. On 
the one hand, they underline the fact that technological change, although an industry-level 
phenomenon, is not exogenously given with respect to the actions of industry participants, but 
is partially shaped by their innovative efforts. TI in effect, is both a “response to incentives” 
created by industry conditions and a “shaper” of those conditions (Porter, 1985: 195). On the 
other hand, they suggest that the performance outcome of a technological innovation may be 
contingent on the technological situation in an industry at a given point in time. Thus an 
understanding of the processes by which TI leads to technological change should be important 
for understanding the determinants of the performance outcomes of TI. 
                                              
4 McEvily and Chakravarthy (2002: 286) prefer the term “normal configuration,” as the term “dominant design” has 
sometimes been taken to imply “that the same [product] configuration is adopted by all firms.”  
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Determinants of Perfomance Outcomes of Technological Change 
Whereas studies of innovation outcomes and technical outcomes of TI span several decades, 
studies seeking to explain firm performance outcomes of technological change are more recent. 
Most of the major studies started to appear at the end of the 1980s, promoted by strategic 
management scholars’ interest in firm-level performance outcomes. 
A lot of the early work in this area focused on explaining why technological change (TC) often 
caused the failure of hitherto successful firms. They traced inferior incumbent performance to 
the impact of TC on firm capabilities, as well as to insufficient investment in new technologies; 
both mediated by the retention of critical complementary assets. More recent studies, however, 
have identified and sought to explain differential performance among firms facing the same TC. 
They have focused on the impact of differential firm approaches to technology sourcing, 
collaborative alliances, and product line strategies amongst other factors. The major findings of 
both streams are summarized in Figure 4, while Table 5 summarizes some selected studies. 
It is pertinent to note here that many followers of the literature on innovation might 
inappropriately identify this set of studies as focusing on the performance outcomes of 
technological  innovation. As we argued earlier, while technological innovation might be 
actively pursued by individual firms, technological change is more or less passively experienced 
by all firms in an industry. Thus this set of studies, which focuses on the effects that the 
substitution of technologies used to satisfy customer needs has on firm fortunes, is classified 
here as focusing on the performance outcomes of technological change. 
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Technological Change and Inferior Firm Performance 
It was observed early on that “radical” technological change often led to the demise of industry 
incumbents (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Cooper and Schendel, 1976; Foster, 1986; 
Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). Hence much of the initial work in this stream focused on 
explaining why TC seemed to worsen the performance of “incumbent” firms, sometimes 
identified in terms of size, and other times in terms of previous market or financial performance 
(Christensen and Bower, 1996; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tripsas, 1997). The various 
explanations that have been given can be grouped into three: the impact of technological 
change on firm capabilities, the consequences of firm investment decisions, and the moderating 
effect of critical complementary assets. 
Firm capabilities. New technologies resulting from technological change may require 
capabilities different from those historically possessed by incumbents, or previous capabilities 
may retain their importance. In the first case, or capability-displacing TC, the relevance of 
historical incumbent capabilities is reduced in favor of a new set of capabilities (Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985; Clark, 1987). However in the second case, or capability-entrenching TC, new 
technologies continue to require previous capabilities, thus “entrenching” their position (Clark, 
1987: 63) within firms. 
As could be expected, capability-entrenching TC has been found to favor incumbents (Cooper 
and Schendel, 1976; Rosenbloom, 2000; Rothaermel, 2001), as the market “rewards” those 
activities and knowledge bases in which they are already proficient (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). 
However, capability-displacing TC has generally been found to prejudice the performance 
positions of incumbents. In the face of capability-displacing TC, incumbents are either unable 
to exploit the new technology, or their investments produce poorer results compared to those of 
new entrants (Christensen et al., 1998; Henderson, 1993; Henderson and Clark, 1990; Tripsas, 
1997). Economic, organizational, and strategic factors deny them the flexibility required to 
react adequately to the change, leading to poorer performance (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003). 
Henderson and Clark (1990) for example, showed that the displacement of firms’ “architectural 
knowledge” is especially lethal. Firm knowledge relating to linkages between product 
components tends to become embedded in structures and information-processing procedures 
that are difficult to change. Thus when this architectural knowledge gets displaced, firms find it 
hard to respond adequately (ibid). Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998) also highlight the importance 
of the dimensions along which incumbent capabilities are entrenched or displaced. They 
suggest that TC will have different outcomes depending on whether capabilities are displaced in 
“core” activities (“encompassing technological change”) or in “complementary” activities 
(“complementary technological change”). 
Finally, Afuah (2000) drew attention to the fact that firm performance could still suffer if TC 
entrenched incumbent capabilities, but displaced the capabilities of their “co-opetitors” 
(suppliers, customers, and complementors). He found support for the hypothesis that TC which 
displaces the capabilities of a firm’s suppliers or customers leads to poorer performance for the 
f i r m  i n  q u e s t i o n .  H e  a l s o  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e closer such firms are to their suppliers 
(operationalized as degree of backward integration), the poorer their performance will be. 
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Incumbent investment. Another set of studies traces the roots of incumbent demise to a failure 
to invest in new technology until it is too late. Though apparently a straightforward 
explanation, varying causal mechanisms have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. 
One group of studies mentioned earlier suggests that incumbents might not invest in a new 
technology for fear of destroying current market power and demand for current products 
(Gilbert and Newbery, 1984b; Henderson, 1993; Reinganum, 1983, 1984). Thus if subsequent TC 
causes a switch to the new technology, incumbent firms would find themselves in a 
disadvantaged position. 
Arend (1999) presents an alternative explanation focusing on the dynamics of oligopoly. In his 
model, TC is exogenous and perfectly foreseeable, such that incumbents could implement it and 
thus block later entrants if they wished to. However, if the new technology implies a short-run 
cost disadvantage relative to current competitors, in the absence of collusion it is possible that 
none of the incumbents will invest in the new technology, leaving them open to the adverse 
impact of new entrants in the future. 
A different explanation for failure to invest comes from Christensen and Bower (Christensen, 
1997; Christensen and Bower, 1996). Combining resource allocation (Bower, 1970) and resource 
dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) theories, they argue that resources in corporations get 
allocated to projects targeting the requirements of powerful customers. Incumbents thus will 
not invest in “inferior” technologies that exhibit a price/performance ratio unattractive to their 
valuable customers. However, the rate of technological progress can cause incumbents’ 
technology to exceed customer requirements, while simultaneously making previously 
“inferior” technologies now attractive to their customers (Christensen and Bower, 1996). Thus 
since they had previously not invested, (because the technology was not initially attractive to 
their valuable customers), they would find themselves in a disadvantaged position (Christensen, 
1997). 
Finally, another set of studies underlines the fact that firms are “embedded within a value 
network of suppliers, customers, investors, complementary product providers, communities, and 
so on, to which the firm has made strategic commitments” (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003: 261). As 
Ghemawat (1991) emphasizes, “strategic” decisions, which “commit” a firm to a particular 
course of action or bundle of resources over the medium to long term, bring along with them a 
certain degree of inflexibility. In addition, a web of implicit and explicit social commitments to 
employees, customers, and communities can also impede adaptation (Rosenbloom, 2000; Sull, 
Tedlow, and Rosenbloom, 1997). Hence incumbents may find themselves unable to make the 
investments necessary to participate effectively in the new technological regime, as a result of 
prior commitments. 
Complementary assets. A third factor, the continued importance of critical complementary 
assets controlled by incumbents, has been shown to moderate the effect of the previous two on 
performance. Tripsas (1997) found that when specialized complementary assets (Teece, 1987) 
unavailable to new entrants retained their value after capability-displacing TC, incumbents 
maintained their market positions even though the technical performance of their products 
proved to be significantly inferior to that of the new entrants. Similarly, Rothaermel (2001) 
found that incumbents whose downstream complementary assets retained their value after TC, 
entered into alliances with new entrants to access the new upstream technology, in exchange 
for access to their downstream assets. In other words, these findings suggest that even if 
incumbents do not have the required capabilities to participate effectively in the new  
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technology, any important complementary assets that “luckily” retain their value after the TC 
will temper the negative effects of capability-displacing TC. 
Technological Change and Differential Firm Performance 
Recent work on the determinants of performance outcomes of TC has increasingly focused on 
differential firm effects. Tripsas suggests that the most serious limitation of the earlier work we 
have been considering is “its treatment of incumbents as a class of firms without distinguishing 
between individual firms within that class. There is great variation in the performance of 
incumbent firms, and understanding that variation is crucial” (Tripsas, 1997: 140). This is 
further underlined by Hill and Rothaermel’s (2003: 257) assertion that the counterexamples to 
the generalized predictions (e.g. Ahuja and Lampert, 2001; Leifer et al., 2000; Methe, 
Swaminathan, Mitchell, and Toyama, 1997; Rothaermel, 2001) are too many to be ignored. 
An additional reason for the growing focus on differential firm effects is the existence of 
conflicting group-level findings in the literature. For example while Tripsas (1997) finds that 
incumbents produced technically inferior products on investing in a capability-displacing 
technology, Christensen and Bower (1996) find that incumbents led the way, even in capability-
displacing technologies, as long as their important customers valued them highly. A number of 
recent studies have begun the attempt to tease apart such interacting effects, extending research 
on the performance outcomes of TC in two important directions. 
Differential incumbent reactions. Firstly, researchers have begun to focus on differential 
incumbent reactions to TC. Thus Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998) studied incumbents’ technology 
sourcing strategies in the face of TC. They predicted the technology acquisition strategy of 
incumbents (equity/non-equity alliances or internal R&D) in terms of how capability-displacing 
TC affects “core” and “complementary” firm activities in manufactured products. 
Building on Nagarajan and Mitchell’s work, Nicholls-Nixon and Woo (2003) suggest that such 
differential approaches to technology sourcing, are related to differing levels of innovative 
output across firms facing the same capability-displacing TC. A related study by Rothaermel 
(2001) showed that incumbents might react by forming alliances with new entrants when 
critical downstream complementary assets that they control retain their value after TC. 
Distinguishing between exploration alliances (aimed at learning the new upstream technology) 
and exploitation alliances (aimed at leveraging the downstream complementary assets), he 
found that incumbents that focused on exploiting complementary assets outperformed those 
that focused on exploring the new technology (in terms of new products introduced). Thus 
these studies suggest that differential incumbent performance after TC might be related to the 
“fitness” of the different capability sourcing strategies they use. 
Differential firm strategy. Beyond a focus on incumbent reactions, Jones (2003) finds that 
product line strategy and product platform strategy explain additional variation in performance 
after capability-displacing TC, controlling for incumbent/entrant-related factors. Specifically he 
shows that variation in overall product introduction rates and longevity, as well as rates of 
platform and derivative introduction and longevity, significantly increase his model’s 
explanatory power. His work thus suggests that a focus on new variables could help to identify 
other drivers of differential post-TC performance. 
Mitchell and Singh (1996) take a different approach, analyzing the impact of pre-TC 
collaborative relationships on post-TC performance. They find that firms using collaborative 
relationships in activities affected by discontinuous TC perform worse after the TC, while firms  
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with collaborative relationships in activities not central to the TC have improved post-TC 
performance. They thus suggest that while collaborative relationships hinder the flexibility of 
the former, for the latter they provide useful help for navigating the TC. 
A final perspective on TC and differential firm performance comes from Lawless and Anderson 
(1996) who study the indirect impact of generational TC
5 on firm performance. They suggest 
that successive generational TC leads to increased environmental complexity as previous 
technologies remain in the market, and firms have a broad range of opportunities to be 
generalists or to specialize in a subset of the available technologies. This is accompanied by an 
evolution of niches or “firm positions in the marketplace” (ibid: 1186). They find that 
performance depends on firm strategies that differentiate them within their own niches, and not 
across niches. They also find that changing niches confers a short-term penalty, and that strong 
performers adopted new technology quickly without changing niches.  
Performance Outcomes of Technological Change 
To sum up, the literature reviewed here gives a clear account of some of the determinants of the 
performance outcomes of technological change. It demonstrates that TC often has a negative 
impact on the performance of previously successful firms, either because of new technology 
that requires capabilities different from those they have historically possessed, or because they 
do not invest in technology that later becomes dominant. This effect is tempered if they control 
other complementary assets required to exploit new technology successfully. 
However, recent work has shown that the same TC can have differential impacts on the post-TC 
performance of incumbents, as a result of factors such as technology sourcing and collaborative 
strategies. Other scholars also suggest that variables cutting across both incumbents and 
entrants can help explain post-TC firm performance. Thus both pre-TC strategic choices, such as 
inter-firm collaboration, and post-TC variables such as product line and product platform 
strategies, can influence the impact of TC on firm performance. 
Future research in this stream will need to provide more robust explanations of differential 
post-TC firm performance. On the one hand this might require the identification of other firm- 
and/or network-level strategies that better explain post-TC performance. On the other hand, 
there is a need for empirical work that can help to determine the relative efficacy of competing 
strategies put forward by different scholars.
6 
Nevertheless, the findings of this important stream of work do not provide an account of the 
determinants of the performance outcomes of firm-level technological innovation. The 
underlying concern of these studies has been more about firm strategies for coping with the 
inexorable march of technological change, and less about the possible outcomes of individual 
technological innovations. Thus these studies do not seem to provide a basis for an assumption 
that technological innovation will improve firm performance. 
                                              
5 A substantial technological advance within the same technological paradigm. 
6 For example, while Christensen (1997) advocates spinning off an independent firm to cope with technological 
change, Iansiti et al. (2003) advise as much integration as possible to leverage existing firm assets.  
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Having said that, it is important to remember, as we pointed out in the previous section, that 
technological innovation is intimately related to technological change. Indeed Cooper and 
Schendel (1976) indicate that TI is a common firm reaction in the face of TC. Thus the increased 
attention to the determinants of the performance outcome of TI advocated in this paper could 
shed more light on performance outcomes of TC as well. 
Determinants of Performance Outcomes of Technological 
Innovation 
Surprisingly few studies have focused on the determinants of the performance outcome of 
technological innovation. While a lot of work has looked at determinants of innovativeness, 
much less light has been shone on the innovation-level contingencies that determine the 
success or failure of individual innovations (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001). Similarly, while a 
good number of studies have investigated technical outcomes, few have considered how and 
when technical aspects affect performance. Nevertheless, some important contributions to 
knowledge on determinants of the performance outcome of TI have staked out the territory, and 
indicate directions for future work. 
In the next section, we review some of these studies and characterize their findings on factors 
that affect the impact of technological innovation on firm performance. We then synthesize 
these with findings from previous sections, to give a comprehensive picture of what we know 
about the outcomes of technological innovation. Finally we conclude, reiterating the need for 
an increased focus on the determinants of the performance outcome of technological 
innovation, and offering possible avenues for building on the existing knowledge in this regard. 
When Does Technological Innovation Improve Performance? 
An important early contribution comes from Teece’s seminal 1986 paper that sought to explain 
why customers, imitators, and other industry participants often benefited from TI, whereas the 
firm that introduced it did not (Teece, 1987). He showed that under a “weak appropriability 
regime,” most profits go to the owners of specialized complementary assets required for 
commercializing an innovation. The strength of the appropriability regime is a function of the 
legal mechanisms available to protect innovations, such as patents, trade secrets, trademarks, 
and copyrights (Teece, 1987); as well as the knowledge characteristics of the innovation: 
whether the knowledge is tacit or codified, observable or non-observable in use, and whether it 
requires tangible assets or not (Teece, 2003). In weak appropriability regimes therefore, 
innovating firms need to have recourse to strategic action (by carefully choosing firm 
boundaries) to protect their returns on TI. 
A different set of variables was highlighted by Banbury and Mitchell’s study, which considered 
how the timing of TI influenced its impact on performance. In focusing on innovations that 
“succeed in the market as a class of goods,” they sought to “differentiate between the success of 
an innovation as a class of goods and the success of specific firms that introduce products that 
incorporate the innovation” (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995: 161, 163). They found that the more 
often a firm was among the first to introduce TI, the greater its market share. In addition, the 
greater the number of competitors that introduced a similar TI, the greater the market share of 
firms that were first to introduce it. Finally, they found that while greater market share reduced  
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the likelihood of business dissolution, TI provided little or no reduction in the likelihood of 
business dissolution net of the effects of the firm’s market share. 
Another point of view is offered by Christensen, Suárez, and Utterback (1998) who suggested 
that the performance impact of TI is dependent on the interaction between its technical and 
market characteristics. In the technical dimension, they differentiated between new technologies 
that result from an improvement in product component technology and those that are 
“architectural”: innovative ways of linking proven components. In the market dimension, they 
distinguished between strategies addressing new market segments and those addressing 
established markets. They found that firms introducing TI that is architectural and targeted at 
new market segments (emerging segments in which a dominant design had not yet been 
established) had significantly higher probabilities of survival than firms introducing TI into 
established market segments, based on improvements in component technology. Also focusing 
on technical and market characteristics, Nerkar and Roberts (2004) found that while experience 
gained in markets “distal” to a focal innovation led to higher initial product sales, “proximal” 
technological experience explained new product success. 
A final set of variables are provided by Gatignon et al. (2002) who develop and test constructs 
for differentiating “innovation” “locus,” “type” and “characteristics.” With respect to locus, they 
distinguish between innovations that affect “core subsystems” and those that affect “peripheral 
subsystems.” Innovation types include “architectural” and “generational” innovation, while 
innovation characteristics differentiate between radical/incremental and competence-
enhancing/competence-destroying innovations. To test the nomological validity of their 
constructs, they apply models of their impact on performance. Their results suggest that the 
greater the complexity of TI, the greater its perceived success, yet the longer it takes to 
introduce. TI affecting core subsystems, which was associated with “both new competence 
acquisition and with building on existing competencies” (ibid: 1118) is associated with the 
greatest commercial success. In line with Henderson and Clark (1990), they also find that 
“architectural” innovations are associated with increased time to introduction, but surprisingly, 
innovations in peripheral subsystems are associated with increased time to market as well. 
In summary, these and a handful of other studies indicate the existence of several variables 
mediating the relationship between TI and performance. On the one hand, studies focusing on 
technical and market characteristics of TI illustrate how these affect the amount of value 
created by TI, and hence its impact on performance. They show that different dimensions in the 
knowledge and capabilities underlying these characteristics affect performance (Christensen et 
al., 1998; Gatignon et al., 2002; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004; Sheremata, 2004). On the other 
hand, studies emphasizing timing, appropriability, and complementary assets illustrate how 
these affect the value appropriated by an innovating firm (e.g. Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; 
Teece, 1987). Their focus on “valuable” innovations shows that market success is not sufficient 
to guarantee that TI will improve firm performance. 
Nevertheless, there remains a pressing need for further delineation of the determinants of the 
performance outcomes of TI. Studies which broach this issue are still very few, and do not yet 
add up to a “solid” knowledge base. There is a need for further empirical testing and replication 
of the results of these pioneer studies in other contexts. For example, Gatignon et al. (2002) 
focus on modifications of existing products, which are only one subset of possible TI modes. 
Similarly, very few studies (Christensen et al. (1998) and Nerkar and Roberts (2004) are two 
notable exceptions) simultaneously consider technical and market determinants of the impact 
of TI on performance. There is therefore a very clear need for further work on highlighting  
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determinants of the performance outcome of TI. In closing, Figure 5 summarizes the existing 
knowledge on the outcomes of technological innovation. 
In Search of a Theory on the Performance Impact of Technological Innovation 
“ W e  s t r e s s  t h a t  b e i n g  n e w  i s  n o t  t h e  s a m e  a s  being desirable. … Recall Kimberly’s (1981) 
comment that the study of innovation suffers from a pervasive positive bias” (McGrath et al., 
1996: 392). 
Managerial and academic effort in the recent past has focused intensely on issues related to 
innovation, with the implicit assumption that increased innovation would lead to improved 
firm performance. Nevertheless, the empirical facts are beginning to indicate that although 
innovativeness has increased, economic performance has not improved correspondingly 
(Kandybin and Kihn, 2004; Linder et al., 2003). The success rate of major innovations remains 
below 20% (Rothaermel, 2001), and tests of the relationship between innovativeness and firm 
performance consistently exhibit mixed results (Capon et al., 1990; Li and Atuahene-Gima, 
2001). 
These findings indicate missing explanatory variables in the technological innovation-
performance relationship. Since individual innovations can have more or less successful 
outcomes, it is not surprising to find an ambiguous overall impact of innovativeness on 
performance. What we require is a delineation of the factors – the innovation-level 
contingencies – which mediate or moderate the relationship between technological innovation 
and firm performance. We need a “circumstance-based” theory (Carlile and Christensen, 2005) 
that can explain how, when, and why technological innovation leads to improved firm 
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Figure 5 
















Our review encompassing 31 journals, 16 edited scholarly volumes, and over 30 books, with 
temporal boundaries from 1934 to the present, shows that the existing literature gives coherent 
explanations of the determinants of innovation outcomes and technical outcomes of 
technological innovation, as well as the determinants of performance outcomes of technological 
change. However, we have seen that relatively little light has been shed on the determinants of 
the  performance outcomes of technological innovation. This area thus represents the next 
frontier for “innovation-performance” studies, as highlighted by the shaded portion of Figure 5. 
We need more studies that map out the contents of the “black box” mediating technological 
innovation and firm performance. While it is true that institutional and legitimacy factors often 
drive innovation (Abrahamson, 1991; Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood, and Hawkins, 2005; Young, 
Charns, and Shortell, 2001), it is also true that one of the most important reasons why firms 
innovate is in order to improve their performance (Burgelman and Rosenbloom, 1997; Zahra, 
1996; Zahra and Covin, 1993). 
Current work indicates that studies seeking to shed further light on the determinants of the 
performance outcome of technological innovation could fruitfully focus on two sub-constructs 
of performance: the amount of value created by TI and the amount of value appropriated by 
innovating firms. Firstly, the amount of value created by TI relative to competing firm offerings 
derives from the interaction between its technical and market characteristics and the focal 
firm’s technological and customer knowledge and capabilities (Christensen et al., 1998; Clark, 
1987; Danneels, 2002; Nerkar and Roberts, 2004). In addition, since value is created for 
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consumers, aspects of the demand environment, such as the way in which they evaluate TI, and 
the way in which this evaluation changes as TI performance improves (Adner, 2002), are critical 
for explaining the impact of TI on firm performance. Thus studies able to: (1) characterize 
differential firm attributes (e.g. different aspects of technical and market knowledge and 
capabilities); (2) characterize different technical and market attributes of TI; and (3) characterize 
aspects of the demand environment, relating all or some of these to firm performance; will 
advance the search for determinants of the performance outcome of TI. 
Secondly, since Teece’s (1987) path-breaking paper, most work on value appropriation from TI 
has focused on factors affecting the imitability of innovations. Innovators are advised to center 
attention on avoiding imitation, failing which they should achieve a superior position in asset 
complementary to the innovation at a cost inferior to the anticipated amount of value up for 
grabs (Grant, 2002; Teece, 1987; Winter, 2000). Yet it is not clear that inimitability guarantees 
superior appropriation. For instance, in the case of innovation based on externally sourced 
technology, there remains the possibility of upstream holdup (Ghemawat, 1991) by technology 
suppliers. On the downstream end, Brandenburger and Stuart (2003) point out that the 
assumption that a monopoly can extract all the value created from consumers is not 
unassailable. 
There is thus a need for further development in the theoretical understanding of the 
circumstances under which innovating firms can appropriate superior amounts of the value 
created by TI under competition. Recent developments in cooperative game theory 
(Brandenburger and Stuart, 2004; MacDonald and Ryall, 2004) integrated into the “micro-
foundations” of the resource-based view of the firm (Lippman and Rumelt, 2003) provide an 
opportunity for deepening this area of knowledge. This line of work offers an opportunity to 
highlight the determinants of the distribution of value created by TI among innovating firms, 
buyers, and suppliers. For instance, studies able to relate idiosyncratic firm endowments to 
superior “added-value” (Brandenburger and Stuart, 1996) or superior complementarity to a 
given technology, and hence to the amount of value appropriated, would further advance the 
search for the determinants of the performance outcome of TI. 
Conclusion 
“Just because innovation is important, that does not necessarily mean that pursuing innovation 
will be profitable for the firm” (Grant, 2002: 334). In this paper, we have argued that both 
empirical evidence and theoretical reflection challenge the positive bias inherent in most 
approaches to technological innovation. Anomalous results call for deeper theoretical 
development, and more refined empirical exploration of the determinants of the performance 
outcome of technological innovation. As a first step in this direction, we presented the results 
of an exhaustive review of the existing knowledge of the determinants of the outcomes of 
technological innovation. We characterized three distinct classes of outcomes and presented a 
model relating the different determinants uncovered in the literature to the various outcomes. 
We thus showed that while a lot of work has apparently focused on innovation “performance,” 
studies actually explaining the performance impact of technological innovation are few and not 
well developed. Finally, in the light of the knowledge uncovered and recent developments in 
work on firm capabilities, we indicated possible avenues for further development of this critical 
area of research. 
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